ACM Transactions on Computer Systems (TOCS)
An attack on the Needham-Schroeder public-key authentication protocol
Information Processing Letters
Prudent Engineering Practice for Cryptographic Protocols
IEEE Transactions on Software Engineering
Strand spaces: proving security protocols correct
Journal of Computer Security
Breaking and Fixing the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Protocol Using FDR
TACAs '96 Proceedings of the Second International Workshop on Tools and Algorithms for Construction and Analysis of Systems
PROCOMET '98 Proceedings of the IFIP TC2/WG2.2,2.3 International Conference on Programming Concepts and Methods
Proving Properties of Security Protocols by Induction
CSFW '97 Proceedings of the 10th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
Athena: a New Efficient Automatic Checker for Security Protocol Analysis
CSFW '99 Proceedings of the 12th IEEE workshop on Computer Security Foundations
A Semantic Model for Authentication Protocols
SP '93 Proceedings of the 1993 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Automated analysis of cryptographic protocols using Mur/spl phi/
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Theory generation for security protocols
Theory generation for security protocols
Finite-state analysis of SSL 3.0
SSYM'98 Proceedings of the 7th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 7
Memorizable interactive proof and zero-knowledge proof systems
Journal of Computer Science and Technology
Authentication tests based on test type matrix
ICC'09 Proceedings of the 2009 IEEE international conference on Communications
Security protocol analysis with improved authentication tests
ISPEC'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Information Security Practice and Experience
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This paper proposes an automatic attack construction algorithm in order to find potential attacks on security protocols. It is based on a dynamic strand space model, which enhances the original strand space model by introducing active modes on strands so as to characterize the dynamic procedure of protocol execution. With exact causal dependency relations between messages considered in the model, this algorithm can avoid state space explosion caused by asynchronous composition. In order to get a finite state space, a new method called strand-added on demand is exploited, which extends a bundle in an incremental manner without requiring explicit configuration of protocol execution parameters. A finer granularity model of term structure is also introduced, in which subterms are divided into check subterms and data subterms. Moreover, data subterms can be further classified based on the compatible data subterm relation to obtain automatically the finite set of valid acceptable terms for an honest principal. In this algorithm, terms core is designed to represent the intruder's knowledge compactly, and forward search technology is used to simulate attack patterns easily. Using this algorithm, a new attack on the Dolve-Yao protocol can be found, which is even more harmful because the secret is revealed before the session terminates.