Modal logic
Dynamic Logic
Alternating-time temporal logic
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Axiomatising Nash-Consistent Coalition Logic
JELIA '02 Proceedings of the European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
A logic for strategic reasoning
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Reasoning about action and cooperation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
On the logic of cooperation and propositional control
Artificial Intelligence
A Dynamic Logic of Agency I: STIT, Capabilities and Powers
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Epistemic games in modal logic: joint actions, knowledge and preferences all together
LORI'09 Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Logic, rationality and interaction
A Dynamic Logic of Agency I: STIT, Capabilities and Powers
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Reasoning about joint action and coalitional ability in Kn with intersection
CLIMA'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
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We continue the work initiated in Herzig and Lorini (J Logic Lang Inform, in press) whose aim is to provide a minimalistic logical framework combining the expressiveness of dynamic logic in which actions are first-class citizens in the object language, with the expressiveness of logics of agency such as STIT and logics of group capabilities such as CL and ATL. We present a logic called $${\mathcal{DDLA}}$$ (Deterministic Dynamic logic of Agency) which supports reasoning about actions and joint actions of agents and coalitions, and agentive and coalitional capabilities. In $${\mathcal{DDLA}}$$ it is supposed that, once all agents have selected a joint action, the effect of this joint action is deterministic. In order to assess $${\mathcal{DDLA}}$$ we prove that it embeds Coalition Logic. We then extend $${\mathcal{DDLA}}$$ with modal operators for agents' preferences, and show that the resulting logic is sufficiently expressive to capture the game-theoretic concepts of best response and Nash equilibrium.