Distributed rational decision making
Multiagent systems
Alternating-Time Temporal Logic
COMPOS'97 Revised Lectures from the International Symposium on Compositionality: The Significant Difference
A logic of games and propositional control
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
A Dynamic Logic of Agency II: Deterministic $${\mathcal{DLA}}$$ , Coalition Logic, and Game Theory
Journal of Logic, Language and Information
Strategic games and truly playable effectivity functions
The 10th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Strategic games and truly playable effectivity functions
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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We add a rule for Nash-consistency to Coalition Logic, a modal logic for reasoning about the abilities and rights of groups in multi-agent systems. Rights of agents (constitutions) can be formalised using Coalition Logic, and the additional inference rule of Nash-consistency will guarantee that any multi-agent system implementing these rights will be stable, i.e., for any preferences the agents might have, there will be rights they can exercise such that no individual deviation will be profitable. We apply this logic to obtain a formal analysis of Gibbard's paradox, and we provide meta-theoretic results, in particular a complete axiomatisation.