Modal logic
Axiomatising Nash-Consistent Coalition Logic
JELIA '02 Proceedings of the European Conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
Alternating-Time Temporal Logic
COMPOS'97 Revised Lectures from the International Symposium on Compositionality: The Significant Difference
Complete axiomatization and decidability of alternating-time temporal logic
Theoretical Computer Science
A normal simulation of coalition logic and an epistemic extension
TARK '07 Proceedings of the 11th conference on Theoretical aspects of rationality and knowledge
Description logic for coalitions
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Reasoning about joint action and coalitional ability in Kn with intersection
CLIMA'11 Proceedings of the 12th international conference on Computational logic in multi-agent systems
Epistemic coalition logic: completeness and complexity
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
State and path coalition effectivity models for logics of multi-player games
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Specification and verification of multi-agent systems
ESSLLI'10 Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ESSLLI 2010, and ESSLLI 2011 conference on Lectures on Logic and Computation
DEON'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science
Strategic games and truly playable effectivity functions
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
A well known (and often used) result by Marc Pauly states that for every playable effectivity function E there exists a strategic game that assigns to coalitions exactly the same power as E, and vice versa. While the latter direction of the correspondence is correct, we show that the former does not always hold in the case of infinite game models. We point out where the proof of correspondence goes wrong, and we present examples of playable effectivity functions in infinite models for which no equivalent strategic game exists. Then, we characterize the class of truly playable effectivity functions, that does correspond to strategic games. Moreover, we discuss a construction that transforms any playable effectivity function into a truly playable one while preserving the power of most (but not all) coalitions. We also show that Coalition Logic is not expressive enough to distinguish between playable and truly playable effectivity functions, and we extend it to a logic that can make this distinction while enjoying finite axiomatization and finite model property.