Agreements as norms

Authors:
Paolo Turrini
Affiliations:
Individual and Collective Reasoning Group (ICR), University of Luxembourg, Kalergi, Luxembourg
Venue:
DEON'12 Proceedings of the 11th international conference on Deontic Logic in Computer Science
Year:
2012

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Abstract

Deontic logic has extensively been used to reason about what a player (or coalition) should do when confronted with several choices at its disposal while being aware of its opponents' possibilities. So far this line of research, inspired by Horty's utilitarian account of obligations, has been focused on interpreting coalitional oughts as rational choices, going on to characterizing game-theoretical solution concepts, such as Nash equilibria. With the present contribution we would like to extend the scope of this account to include contractual aspects of coalitional choices, arguing that deontic logic can be used as a comprehensive reasoning tool for the normative aspects of game theory.