Co-evolution of cooperative strategies under egoism

  • Authors:
  • Ta-Chun Lien;Tian-Li Yu;Ying-Shiuan You

  • Affiliations:
  • National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan Roc;National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan Roc;National Taiwan University, Taipei, Taiwan Roc

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 12th annual conference on Genetic and evolutionary computation
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

This paper examines which elements are necessary for coevolutionary genetic algorithms to evolve cooperative strategies under pure egoistic considerations. Since competitions and cooperations coexist in an auction-based manpower allocation problem, the problem is adopted for further investigation. To alleviate analytical burden, the problem is abstracted to a resource-bidding game under the Nash game framework. A mathematical model for the resource-bidding game is defined and several special cases are illustrated. One of these special cases, named c-mNE, is further investigated due to the existance of cooperative modes. Various kinds of egoistic fitness functions and evolutionary mechanisms are experimented on c-mNE. Based on the experimental results, this paper suggests that coevolutionary mechanisms which properly eliminate aggressive strategies and preserve cooperative strategies can evolve cooperative modes under the pure egoistic assumption.