Implicit fitness and heterogeneous preferences in the genetic algorithm

  • Authors:
  • Justin T.H. Smith

  • Affiliations:
  • University of New Mexico, Albuquerque, NM, USA

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 12th annual conference companion on Genetic and evolutionary computation
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

This paper takes an economic approach to derive an evolutionary learning model based entirely on the endogenous use of genetic operators in the employment of self-interested autonomous agents. Reproductive decisions depend on subjective tradeoffs between the quality and quantity of offspring. This avoids the imposition of an external fitness function typically used by genetic algorithms in favor of evolving, heterogeneous preferences over risky reproductive outcomes, expressed via optimal reaction functions. An application to learning in a repeated Cournot oligopoly game is developed, with analytical predictions tested against a computational simulation. With evolutionary coordination via intergenerational wealth transfers, risk-averse firms learn to cooperate to Cournot-Nash market equilibria, raising the market price above costs to fund risk-spreading reproductive strategies.