Genetic programming learning and the Cobweb model
Advances in genetic programming
Adaptation in Natural and Artificial Systems: An Introductory Analysis with Applications to Biology, Control and Artificial Intelligence
Robust Evolutionary Algorithm Design for Socio-economic Simulation
Computational Economics
Robust Evolutionary Algorithm Design for Socio-economic Simulation
Computational Economics
Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm for Agent-Based Artificial Markets
Computational Economics
Implicit fitness and heterogeneous preferences in the genetic algorithm
Proceedings of the 12th annual conference companion on Genetic and evolutionary computation
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We examine the Cournot oligopoly model in the context of social and individual learning. In both models of learning, firms update their decisions about how much to produce via variants of the genetic algorithm updating procedure. Arifovic (1994) found that both models of social and individual learning converged to the Walrasian, competitive equilibrium. Vriend (2000) reports that the model of social learning converges to the Walrasian equilibrium outcome, while the model of individual learning converges to the Cournot---Nash equilibrium. We revisit the issue and conduct simulations varying elements of the updating algorithms, as well as of the underlying economic model. In the analysis of the outcomes of our simulations, we conclude that the convergence to the Cournot---Nash equilibrium is due to two things: the specific way in which production rules' performance is evaluated coupled with a specific cost function specification.