A secondary market for spectrum

Authors:
Hong Xu;Jin Jin;Baochun Li
Affiliations:
Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto;Department of Electrical and Computer Engineering, University of Toronto
Venue:
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Year:
2010

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Abstract

Dynamic spectrum trading amongst small cognitive users is fundamentally different along two axes: temporal variation, and spatial variation of user demand and channel condition. We advocate that a spectrum secondary market, analogous to the stock market, is to be established for users to dynamically trade among themselves their channel holdings obtained in the primary market from legacy owners. We design a market mechanism based on dynamic double auctions, creating a marketplace in the air to match bandwidth demand with supply. In the analysis we prove important economic properties of the mechanism, notably its truthfulness and asymptotic efficiency in maximizing spectrum utilization. Complimentary simulation studies corroborate that spectrum utilization and user performance can be improved by establishing the spectrum secondary market.