Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)
STOC '99 Proceedings of the thirty-first annual ACM symposium on Theory of computing
Flexible double auctions for electionic commerce: theory and implementation
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Concurrent auctions across the supply chain
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Proceedings of the 11th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Chicago spectrum occupancy measurements & analysis and a long-term studies proposal
TAPAS '06 Proceedings of the first international workshop on Technology and policy for accessing spectrum
eBay in the Sky: strategy-proof wireless spectrum auctions
Proceedings of the 14th ACM international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Truthful Double Auction Mechanisms
Operations Research
Revenue generation for truthful spectrum auction in dynamic spectrum access
Proceedings of the tenth ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Practical, distributed channel assignment and routing in dual-radio mesh networks
Proceedings of the ACM SIGCOMM 2009 conference on Data communication
Incentive-compatible, budget-balanced, yet highly efficient auctions for supply chain formation
Decision Support Systems - Special issue: The fourth ACM conference on electronic commerce
A secondary market for spectrum
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Efficient and Strategyproof Spectrum Allocations in Multichannel Wireless Networks
IEEE Transactions on Computers
Spectrum auction framework for access allocation in cognitive radio networks
IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking (TON)
Multi-Stage Pricing Game for Collusion-Resistant Dynamic Spectrum Allocation
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
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With the increasing number of handheld and mobile devices, the demand for available spectrum resource is experiencing a rapid growth. Auction has been widely used for spectrum resource allocation in ubiquitous communications due to its fairness. However, many existing spectrum auction schemes inherently limit users' ability to fully utilize the spectrum due to the assumption that the spectrum resource is single unit and indivisible. Besides, most of them fail to take into account of buyer/seller's distinctive demands in auction and consider spectrum allocation as single-sided auction. In this paper, we consider the multi-unit double auction problem under the context that multiple buyers/sellers have different demands to buy/sell. Particularly, we present a novel strategy-proof multi-unit double auction scheme (SPRITE). SPRITE establishes a series of bid-related buyer group construction and winner determination strategies. It improves the spectrum reusability and achieves sound spectrum utilization, fairness, and essential economic properties. In the theoretical analysis, we have shown the correctness, effectiveness, and economic properties of SPRITE and prove that SPRITE is strategy-proof. In the evaluation study, we further show that SPRITE can achieve multi-unit spectrum auction with better auction efficiency compared with existing double auction mechanisms. To the best of our knowledge, SPRITE is the first multi-unit double auction approach that guarantees the competitive fairness among buyers while remaining strategy-proof for spectrum allocation. Furthermore, the multi-unit double auction mechanism proposed in this work helps increasing flexibility of the ubiquitous devices for spectrum usage.