Sellers competing for buyers in online markets: reserve prices, shill bids, and auction fees
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Evolutionary mechanism design: a review
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
An Equilibrium Analysis of Competing Double Auction Marketplaces Using Fictitious Play
Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Competition between markets and the CAT Tournament: Guest editors' introduction to the special issue
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
An assessment of strategies for choosing between competitive marketplaces
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
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In this paper, we propose a novel general framework for analysing competing double auction markets that vie for traders, who then need to choose which market to go to. Based on this framework, we analyse the competition between two markets in detail. Specifically, we game-theoretically analyse the equilibrium behaviour of traders' market selection strategies and adopt evolutionary game theory to investigate how traders dynamically change their strategies, and thus, which equilibrium, if any, can be reached. In so doing, we show that it is unlikely for these competing markets to coexist. Eventually, all traders will always converge to locating themselves at one of the markets. Somewhat surprisingly, we find that sometimes all traders converge to the market that charges higher fees. Thus we further analyse this phenomenon, and specifically determine the factors that affect such migration.