Decision procedures for multiple auctions
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 2
Developing a bidding agent for multiple heterogeneous auctions
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Market-based recommendation: Agents that compete for consumer attention
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
The effects of shilling on final bid prices in online auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
The effects of proxy bidding and minimum bid increments within eBay auctions
ACM Transactions on the Web (TWEB)
A Heuristic Based Seller Agent for Simultaneous English Auctions
Proceedings of the 2008 conference on ECAI 2008: 18th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
Setting discrete bid levels adaptively in repeated auctions
Proceedings of the 11th International Conference on Electronic Commerce
AAAI'08 Proceedings of the 23rd national conference on Artificial intelligence - Volume 3
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
A game-theoretic analysis of market selection strategies for competing double auction marketplaces
Proceedings of the 9th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems: volume 1 - Volume 1
Auctions and bidding: A guide for computer scientists
ACM Computing Surveys (CSUR)
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Computing pure Bayesian-Nash equilibria in games with finite actions and continuous types
Artificial Intelligence
Autonomous Seller Agent for Multiple Simultaneous English Auctions
International Journal of Agent Technologies and Systems
Competing intermediary auctions
Proceedings of the 2013 international conference on Autonomous agents and multi-agent systems
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We consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions through a mediating auction institution, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in which both sellers set reserve prices above their production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., bidding as a buyer in its own auction). This shill bidding is undesirable as it introduces inefficiencies within the market. However, through the use of an evolutionary simulation, we extend the analytical results beyond the two-seller case, and we then show that these inefficiencies can be effectively reduced when the mediating auction institution uses auction fees based on the difference between the auction closing and reserve prices.