An optimal strategy for sellers in an online auction
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
A probabilistic approach to automated bidding in alternative auctions
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web
Law-governed peer-to-peer auctions
Proceedings of the 11th international conference on World Wide Web
Developing a bidding agent for multiple heterogeneous auctions
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
When snipers become predators: can mechanism design save online auctions?
Communications of the ACM - Mobile computing opportunities and challenges
An "Alternating Recognition" Model of English Auctions
Management Science
Optimal design of English auctions with discrete bid levels
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Bidding agents for online auctions with hidden bids
Machine Learning
Optimal design of english auctions with discrete bid levels
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Sellers competing for buyers in online markets: reserve prices, shill bids, and auction fees
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Enhancing remote participation in live auctions: an 'intelligent' gavel
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Assessing success factors of selling practices in electronic marketplaces
Proceedings of the International Conference on Management of Emergent Digital EcoSystems
Design of online auctions: Proxy versus non-proxy settings
Decision Support Systems
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We present a mathematical model of the eBay auction protocol and perform a detailed analysis of the effects that the eBay proxy bidding system and the minimum bid increment have on the auction properties. We first consider the revenue of the auction, and we show analytically that when two bidders with independent private valuations use the eBay proxy bidding system there exists an optimal value for the minimum bid increment at which the auctioneer's revenue is maximized. We then consider the sequential way in which bids are placed within the auction, and we show analytically that independent of assumptions regarding the bidders' valuation distribution or bidding strategy the number of visible bids placed is related to the logarithm of the number of potential bidders. Thus, in many cases, it is only a minority of the potential bidders that are able to submit bids and are visible in the auction bid history (despite the fact that the other hidden bidders are still effectively competing for the item). Furthermore, we show through simulation that the minimum bid increment also introduces an inefficiency to the auction, whereby a bidder who enters the auction late may find that its valuation is insufficient to allow them to advance the current bid by the minimum bid increment despite them actually having the highest valuation for the item. Finally, we use these results to consider appropriate strategies for bidders within real world eBay auctions. We show that while last-minute bidding (sniping) is an effective strategy against bidders engaging in incremental bidding (and against those with common values), in general, delaying bidding is disadvantageous even if delayed bids are sure to be received before the auction closes. Thus, when several bidders submit last-minute bids, we show that rather than seeking to bid as late as possible, a bidder should try to be the first sniper to bid (i.e., it should “snipe before the snipers”).