Do electronic marketplaces lower the price of goods?
Communications of the ACM
When snipers become predators: can mechanism design save online auctions?
Communications of the ACM - Mobile computing opportunities and challenges
Information Technology and Management
Information Technology and Management
A family of growth models for representing the price process in online auctions
Proceedings of the ninth international conference on Electronic commerce
Enhancing remote participation in live auctions: an 'intelligent' gavel
Proceedings of the SIGCHI Conference on Human Factors in Computing Systems
Sellers competing for buyers in online markets: reserve prices, shill bids, and auction fees
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Bidding behavior in dynamic auction settings: An empirical analysis of eBay
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Operational efficiency of decentralized Internet auction mechanisms
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Competing sellers in online markets: reserve prices, shill bidding, and auction fees
TADA/AMEC'06 Proceedings of the 2006 AAMAS workshop and TADA/AMEC 2006 conference on Agent-mediated electronic commerce: automated negotiation and strategy design for electronic markets
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Price comparison: A reliable approach to identifying shill bidding in online auctions?
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Survey: Combating online in-auction fraud: Clues, techniques and challenges
Computer Science Review
Reputation and Uncertainty in Online Markets: An Experimental Study
Information Systems Research
The importance of individual characteristics on consideration sets for online auction buyers
Journal of Theoretical and Applied Electronic Commerce Research
Detecting online auction shilling frauds using supervised learning
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
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An increasing number of reports of online auction fraud are of growing concern to auction operators and participants. In this research, we discuss reserve price shilling, where a bidder shills in order to avoid paying auction house fees, rather than to drive up the price of the final bid. We examine the effect that premium bids have upon the final selling price, since they are linked with reserve price shill bids. We use 10,260 eBay auctions during April 2001, and identify 919 auctions involving 322 sellers and 1583 bidders involved in concurrent auctions for the exact same item. We find that premium bidding occurs 23% of the time, in 263 of the 919 auctions. Using a theoretical perspective involving valuation signals, we show that other bidders may view high bids as signals that an item is worth more. Thus, they may be willing to pay more for the items than others that do not receive premium bids. The implications are disturbing in that sellers may be more motivated to enter a shill bid in order to drive up the final price in an online auction. We also examine and report on alternative hypotheses involving winner's curse and the possibility of reserve price shill bids. Our results are developed in the context of a weighted least squares regression model that predicts an item selling price-to-average selling price ratio.