Market-based control: a paradigm for distributed resource allocation
Market-based control: a paradigm for distributed resource allocation
Decision procedures for multiple auctions
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 2
Developing a bidding agent for multiple heterogeneous auctions
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Market-based recommendation: Agents that compete for consumer attention
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
The effects of shilling on final bid prices in online auctions
Electronic Commerce Research and Applications
Bilateral bargaining with multiple opportunities: knowing your opponent's bargaining position
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part C: Applications and Reviews
Self-organized routing for wireless microsensor networks
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
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In this paper, we consider competition between sellers offering similar items in concurrent online auctions, where each seller must set its individual auction parameters (such as the reserve price) in such a way as to attract buyers. We show that in the case of two sellers with asymmetric production costs, there exists a pure Nash equilibrium in which both sellers set reserve prices above their production costs. In addition, we show that, rather than setting a reserve price, a seller can further improve its utility by shill bidding (i.e., pretending to be a buyer in order to bid in its own auction). But, through the use of an evolutionary simulation, we show that this shill bidding introduces inefficiences within the market. However, we then go on to show that these inefficiences can be reduced when the mediating auction institution uses appropriate auction fees that deter sellers from submitting shill bids. Specifically, we compare two types of auction fees and show that, in this respect, those based on the difference between the closing price and the reserve price are more effective than the commonly used fees that are based on closing price alone.