Enhancing privacy and trust in electronic communities
Proceedings of the 1st ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Analyzing the economic efficiency of eBay-like online reputation reporting mechanisms
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM conference on Electronic Commerce
Experimental games for the design of reputation management systems
IBM Systems Journal
A model of a trust-based recommendation system on a social network
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Do social networks improve e-commerce?: a study on social marketplaces
Proceedings of the first workshop on Online social networks
Experimental evaluation of an ebay-style self-reporting reputation mechanism
WINE'05 Proceedings of the First international conference on Internet and Network Economics
Hi-index | 0.00 |
We experimentally evaluate reputation mechanisms in an exchange market in which participants have the option of not fulfilling their contracts. These mechanisms vary in the information they provide on past behavior. Participants can choose who they trade with, allowing endogenous responses to low reputation through ostracizing or price discriminating behaviors. The participants responded strategically to the provided information. In particular, mechanisms revealing more information had a statistically significant increase in fulfillment rates and endogenous self-reporting of transaction outcomes was about the same as accurate exogenous reports. Our experimental design allowed us to identify the effect of reputation mechanism on endogenous market behavior. We found that decreasing fulfillment led to lower efficiency and increased market volume but did not affect the prices. We also find a large diversity of individual behavior within the experiments.