Stabilizing trust and reputation for self-stabilizing efficient hosts in spite of byzantine guests

  • Authors:
  • Shlomi Dolev;Reuven Yagel

  • Affiliations:
  • Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel;Ben-Gurion University, Beer-Sheva, Israel

  • Venue:
  • ACM SIGOPS Operating Systems Review
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

This work presents a general and complete method to protect a system against possible malicious programs. We provide concepts for building a system that can automatically recover from an arbitrary state including even one in which a Byzantine execution of one or more programs repeatedly attempts to corrupt the system state. Preservation of a guest execution is guaranteed as long as the guest respects a predefined contract, while efficiency is improved by using stabilizing reputation. We augment a provable self-stabilizing host operating system implementation with a contract-enforcement framework example.