Peer-assisted online games with social reciprocity
Proceedings of the Nineteenth International Workshop on Quality of Service
Characterizing the file hosting ecosystem: A view from the edge
Performance Evaluation
Auction-based P2P VoD streaming: Incentives and optimal scheduling
ACM Transactions on Multimedia Computing, Communications, and Applications (TOMCCAP) - Special Issue on P2P Streaming
Economics of BitTorrent communities
Proceedings of the 21st international conference on World Wide Web
BSU: a biased seed unchoking algorithm for p2p systems
IDCS'12 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Internet and Distributed Computing Systems
On the performance and fairness of BitTorrent-like data swarming systems with NAT devices
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
User behaviors in private BitTorrent communities
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Incentive mechanisms play a critical role in P2P systems. Private BitTorrent sites use a novel incentive paradigm, where the sites record upload and download amounts of users and require each user to maintain its upload-to-download ratio above a specified threshold. This paper explores in-depth incentives in private P2P file-sharing systems. Our contributions are threefold. We first conduct a measurement study on a representative private BitTorrent site, examining how incentives influence user behavior. Our measurement study shows that, as compared with public torrents, a private BitTorrent site provides more incentive for users to contribute and seed. Second, we develop a game theoretic model and analytically show that the ratio mechanism indeed provides effective incentives. But existing ratio incentives in private BitTorrent sites are vulnerable to collusions. Third, to prevent collusion, we propose an upload entropy scheme, and show through analysis and experiment that the entropy scheme successfully limits colluding, while rarely affecting normal users who do not collude.