Measurements, analysis, and modeling of BitTorrent-like systems
IMC '05 Proceedings of the 5th ACM SIGCOMM conference on Internet Measurement
Resource demand and supply in BitTorrent content-sharing communities
Computer Networks: The International Journal of Computer and Telecommunications Networking
INFOCOM'10 Proceedings of the 29th conference on Information communications
Understanding and Improving Ratio Incentives in Private Communities
ICDCS '10 Proceedings of the 2010 IEEE 30th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Public and private BitTorrent communities: a measurement study
IPTPS'10 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Peer-to-peer systems
Is content publishing in BitTorrent altruistic or profit-driven?
Proceedings of the 6th International COnference
The bittorrent p2p file-sharing system: measurements and analysis
IPTPS'05 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Peer-to-Peer Systems
Systemic Risk and User-Level Performance in Private P2P Communities
IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems
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Many private BitTorrent communities employ Sharing Ratio Enforcement (SRE) schemes to incentivize users to contribute. It has been demonstrated that users in private communities are highly dedicated and that they seed much longer than users in communities where SRE is not employed. While most previous studies focus on showing the positive effect of user dedication in achieving high download speed, in this paper we explore the user behaviors in private communities, we argue the reasons for these behaviors, and we demonstrate both the positive and the negative effects of these behaviors. We show that under SRE, users seed for excessively long times to maintain required sharing ratios, but that their seedings are often not very productive (in terms of low upload speed) and that their long seeding times do not necessarily lead to large upload amounts. We find that as users evolve in the community, some users become more committed, in terms of increasing ratios between their seeding and leeching times. In the mean time, some users game the system by keeping risky and low sharing ratios while leeching more often than seeding. Based on these observations, we analyze strategies that alleviate the negative effects of these user behaviors from both the user's and the community administrator's perspective.