Fundamentals of computer security technology
Fundamentals of computer security technology
Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World
Secrets & Lies: Digital Security in a Networked World
Introduction to Algorithms
A Structural Framework for Modeling Multi-Stage Network Attacks
ICPPW '02 Proceedings of the 2002 International Conference on Parallel Processing Workshops
ADEPTS: Adaptive Intrusion Response Using Attack Graphs in an E-Commerce Environment
DSN '05 Proceedings of the 2005 International Conference on Dependable Systems and Networks
Security modeling and quantification of intrusion tolerant systems using attack-response graph
Journal of High Speed Networks
A framework for analyzing and mitigating the vulnerabilities of complex systems via attack and protection trees
SHARPE at the age of twenty two
ACM SIGMETRICS Performance Evaluation Review
Strategic games on defense trees
FAST'06 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Formal aspects in security and trust
ICISC'05 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Automatic synthesis of SRN models from system operation templates for availability analysis
SAFECOMP'11 Proceedings of the 30th international conference on Computer safety, reliability, and security
Quantitative questions on attack: defense trees
ICISC'12 Proceedings of the 15th international conference on Information Security and Cryptology
Comparing attack trees and misuse cases in an industrial setting
Information and Software Technology
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Attack tree (AT) is one of the widely used combinatorial models in cyber security analysis. The basic formalism of AT does not take into account defense mechanisms. Defense trees (DT) have been developed to investigate the effect of defense mechanisms using measures such as attacker's cost and security cost, return on investment (ROI) and return on attack (ROA). DT, however, places defense mechanisms only at the leaf node level while the corresponding ROI/ROA analysis does not incorporate the probability of attack. In attack response tree (ART), attacker-defender game was used to fin optimal policy from the countermeasures' pool and it suffers from the problem of state-space explosion, since solution in ART is resolved by means of a partially observable stochastic game model. In this paper, we present a novel attack tree named attack countermeasure trees (ACT) in which (i) defense mechanisms can be applied at any node of the tree, not just at leaf node level, (ii) qualitative analysis (using mincuts, structural and Birnbaum importance measure) and probabilistic analysis (using attacker and security cost, system risk, impact of an attack, ROI and ROA) can be performed (iii) optimal countermeasure set can be selected from the pool of defense mechanisms without constructing a state-space model. We use single and multi-objective optimization to fin suitable countermeasures under different constraints. We illustrate the features of ACT using a practical case study (SCADA attack).