Apiary: easy-to-use desktop application fault containment on commodity operating systems

  • Authors:
  • Shaya Potter;Jason Nieh

  • Affiliations:
  • Computer Science Department, Columbia University;Computer Science Department, Columbia University

  • Venue:
  • USENIXATC'10 Proceedings of the 2010 USENIX conference on USENIX annual technical conference
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Desktop computers are often compromised by the interaction of untrusted data and buggy software. To address this problem, we present Apiary, a system that transparently contains application faults while retaining the usage metaphors of a traditional desktop environment. Apiary accomplishes this with three key mechanisms. It isolates applications in containers that integrate in a controlled manner at the display and file system. It introduces ephemeral containers that are quickly instantiated for single application execution, to prevent any exploit that occurs from persisting and to protect user privacy. It introduces the Virtual Layered File System to make instantiating containers fast and space efficient, and to make managing many containers no more complex than a single traditional desktop. We have implemented Apiary on Linux without any application or operating system kernel changes. Our results with real applications, known exploits, and a 24-person user study show that Apiary has modest performance overhead, is effective in limiting the damage from real vulnerabilities, and is as easy for users to use as a traditional desktop.