Channel surfing and spatial retreats: defenses against wireless denial of service
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
The feasibility of launching and detecting jamming attacks in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 6th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
On link layer denial of service in data wireless LANs: Research Articles
Wireless Communications & Mobile Computing
A framework for MAC protocol misbehavior detection in wireless networks
Proceedings of the 4th ACM workshop on Wireless security
Comparison of multi-channel MAC protocols
MSWiM '05 Proceedings of the 8th ACM international symposium on Modeling, analysis and simulation of wireless and mobile systems
Energy-efficient link-layer jamming attacks against wireless sensor network MAC protocols
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Security of ad hoc and sensor networks
Jamming and sensing of encrypted wireless ad hoc networks
Proceedings of the 7th ACM international symposium on Mobile ad hoc networking and computing
Channel surfing: defending wireless sensor networks from interference
Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Information processing in sensor networks
PPR: partial packet recovery for wireless networks
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
A multi-channel defense against jamming attacks in wireless sensor networks
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on QoS and security for wireless and mobile networks
Intelligent jamming in wireless networks with applications to 802.11b and other networks
MILCOM'06 Proceedings of the 2006 IEEE conference on Military communications
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We consider the problem of identifying the insider-based attacks in the form of jammers in a single-hop wireless network, where jammers have the inside knowledge of frequency hopping patterns and any protocols used in the wireless network. We propose a novel technique, called "alibi", to identify the insider-based jammers in multichannel wireless networks. Alibi is a form of defense whereby a defendant attempts to prove that he or she was elsewhere when the crime in question was committed. From this concept, we propose two alibi-based protocols to demonstrate how to identify insider-based jammers using alibi techniques. We show several important properties of these protocols such as completeness, accuracy & detection speed in ns2 simulation and analysis. The overall results of these protocols show a promising research direction to deal with insider-based jamming attacks.