Channel surfing and spatial retreats: defenses against wireless denial of service

  • Authors:

  • Wenyuan Xu;Timothy Wood;Wade Trappe;Yanyong Zhang

  • Affiliations:

  • Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Piscataway, NJ;Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Piscataway, NJ;Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Piscataway, NJ;Rutgers, The State University of New Jersey, Piscataway, NJ

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security
  • Year:
  • 2004

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

Wireless networks are built upon a shared medium that makes it easy for adversaries to launch denial of service (DoS) attacks. One form of denial of service is targeted at preventing sources from communicating. These attacks can be easily accomplished by an adversary by either bypassing MAC-layer protocols, or emitting a radio signal targeted at jamming a particular channel. In this paper we present two strategies that may be employed by wireless devices to evade a MAC/PHY-layer jamming-style wireless denial of service attack. The first strategy, channel surfing, is a form of spectral evasion that involves legitimate wireless devices changing the channel that they are operating on. The second strategy, spatial retreats, is a form of spatial evasion whereby legitimate mobile devices move away from the locality of the DoS emitter. We study both of these strategies for three broad wireless communication scenarios: two-party radio communication, an infrastructured wireless network, and an ad hoc wireless network. We evaluate several of our proposed strategies and protocols through ns-2 simulations and experiments on the Berkeley mote platform.