DOMINO: a system to detect greedy behavior in IEEE 802.11 hotspots
Proceedings of the 2nd international conference on Mobile systems, applications, and services
Channel surfing and spatial retreats: defenses against wireless denial of service
Proceedings of the 3rd ACM workshop on Wireless security
Proceedings of the 10th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
Detecting MAC Layer Back-off Timer Violations in Mobile Ad Hoc Networks
ICDCS '06 Proceedings of the 26th IEEE International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems
Distributed channel management in uncoordinated wireless environments
Proceedings of the 12th annual international conference on Mobile computing and networking
802.11 denial-of-service attacks: real vulnerabilities and practical solutions
SSYM'03 Proceedings of the 12th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 12
Understanding and mitigating the impact of RF interference on 802.11 networks
Proceedings of the 2007 conference on Applications, technologies, architectures, and protocols for computer communications
Journal of Computer Security - Special Issue on Security of Ad-hoc and Sensor Networks
Denial-of-Service attacks and countermeasures in IEEE 802.11 wireless networks
Computer Standards & Interfaces
Modeling of the channel-hopping anti-jamming defense in multi-radio wireless networks
Proceedings of the 5th Annual International Conference on Mobile and Ubiquitous Systems: Computing, Networking, and Services
Detection of radio interference attacks in VANET
GLOBECOM'09 Proceedings of the 28th IEEE conference on Global telecommunications
Throughput analysis of IEEE 802.11 multihop ad hoc wireless networks under saturation condition
ISCC '10 Proceedings of the The IEEE symposium on Computers and Communications
Performance analysis of the IEEE 802.11 distributed coordination function
IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications
Defending against jamming attacks in wireless local area networks
ATC'07 Proceedings of the 4th international conference on Autonomic and Trusted Computing
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Denial of Service (DoS) attack is a powerful attack that disrupts the network and deprives the legitimate users from utilizing the network resources. DoS attacks could be implemented to target any layer of the Open Systems Interconnection (OSI) layers, in this paper we are focusing on DoS attacks that target the Medium Access Control (MAC) layer in wireless networks. We present a complete solution using Cross Layer Design techniques to detect and identify the attackers and to mitigate the attack by minimizing the negative impact on the network. DoS attacks could range from plain attacks which do not require any protocol modifications or intelligence during the attack like the signal jamming attack to sophisticated attacks where the attacker is intelligent and aware of its surroundings and constantly modifying its behavior during the attack to appear as a legitimate node to avoid detection. In this paper we are focusing on the sophisticated DoS attack in wireless networks using IEEE 802.11 Distributed Coordination Function (DCF) protocols [1-3], where the attacker is striving to appear as a legitimate member of the network and fully joined the network group and possesses for instance the spread sequence or the channel coding scheme. The algorithm is examined in fixed and mobile environments with multiple Physical (PHY) layer technologies (DSSS, FHSS, and OFDM) using different MAC layer protocols (IEEE 802.11, IEEE 802.11b, and IEEE 802.11g). DoS attackers illegally alter the IEEE 802.11 DCF standards and modify the MAC firmware code in the Network Interface Card (NIC) on their communication equipment to capture the channel by maximizing the packet transmission success rate to a degree where all other legitimate node will have near zero percent success rate for their packet transmissions. This type of DoS attack generally results in bandwidth starvation and extreme power and CPU processing consumption to the legitimate nodes in the network. Two-dimensional Markov Chain is modeled to obtain the maximum throughput to identify the DoS attackers and the rest of the presented algorithm mitigates the impact of the attackers while deceiving the attackers and make them falsely believe that the attacks are still disrupting the network so they do not resort to modifying the attacking techniques. The algorithm is validated using network simulations under different condition using different technologies.