Modelling Multilateral Negotiation in Linear Logic

  • Authors:
  • Daniele Porello;Ulle Endriss

  • Affiliations:
  • Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, email: d.porello@uva.nl, ulle.endriss@uva.nl;Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam, email: d.porello@uva.nl, ulle.endriss@uva.nl

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 2010 conference on ECAI 2010: 19th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

We show how to embed a framework for multilateral negotiation, in which a group of agents implement a sequence of deals concerning the exchange of a number of resources, into linear logic. In this model, multisets of goods, allocations of resources, preferences of agents, and deals are all modelled as formulas of linear logic. Whether or not a proposed deal is rational, given the preferences of the agents concerned, reduces to a question of provability, as does the question of whether there exists a sequence of deals leading to an allocation with certain desirable properties, such as maximising social welfare. Thus, linear logic provides a formal basis for modelling convergence properties in distributed resource allocation.