Modal logics of negotiation and preference

  • Authors:
  • Ulle Endriss;Eric Pacuit

  • Affiliations:
  • Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam;Institute for Logic, Language and Computation, University of Amsterdam

  • Venue:
  • JELIA'06 Proceedings of the 10th European conference on Logics in Artificial Intelligence
  • Year:
  • 2006

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Abstract

We develop a dynamic modal logic that can be used to model scenarios where agents negotiate over the allocation of a finite number of indivisible resources. The logic includes operators to speak about both preferences of individual agents and deals regarding the reallocation of certain resources. We reconstruct a known result regarding the convergence of sequences of mutually beneficial deals to a Pareto optimal allocation of resources, and discuss the relationship between reasoning tasks in our logic and problems in negotiation. For instance, checking whether a given restricted class of deals is sufficient to guarantee convergence to a Pareto optimal allocation for a specific negotiation scenario amounts to a model checking problem; and the problem of identifying conditions on preference relations that would guarantee convergence for a restricted class of deals under all circumstances can be cast as a question in modal logic correspondence theory.