Negotiating over small bundles of resources

  • Authors:
  • Yann Chevaleyre;Ulle Endriss;Jérôme Lang;Nicolas Maudet

  • Affiliations:
  • Université Paris-Daupine (France);Imperial College London (UK);Université Paul Sabatier, Toulouse (France);Université Paris-Daupine (France)

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
  • Year:
  • 2005

Quantified Score

Hi-index 0.00

Visualization

Abstract

When rational but myopic agents negotiate over the exchange of indivisible resources, any restriction to the negotiation protocol may prevent the system from converging to a socially optimal allocation in the general case. This paper addresses this issue by analysing how the confinement to certain classes of utility functions can enable agents to move to an optimal allocation by negotiating over small bundles of items at a time. In particular, we consider so-called k-separable domains, where the full set of resources can be divided into several preferentially independent bundles of limited cardinality.