Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Strategic negotiation in multiagent environments
Desiderata for agent argumentation protocols
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Issues in Agent Communication
Dialogues for Negotiation: Agent Varieties and Dialogue Sequences
ATAL '01 Revised Papers from the 8th International Workshop on Intelligent Agents VIII
Contract Type Sequencing for Reallocative Negotiation
ICDCS '00 Proceedings of the The 20th International Conference on Distributed Computing Systems ( ICDCS 2000)
A Manifesto for Agent Technology: Towards Next Generation Computing
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
The Influence of Social Dependencies on Decision-Making: Initial Investigations with a New Game
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 2
Negotiation to Improve Role Adoption in Organizations
AAMAS '04 Proceedings of the Third International Joint Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 3
On the Communication Complexity of Multilateral Trading: Extended Report
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
The complexity of contract negotiation
Artificial Intelligence
Negotiating over small bundles of resources
Proceedings of the fourth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Monotonic concession protocols for multilateral negotiation
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Negotiating efficient outcomes over multiple issues
AAMAS '06 Proceedings of the fifth international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems
Utilitarian resource assignment
Journal of Discrete Algorithms
The complexity of deciding reachability properties of distributed negotiation schemes
Theoretical Computer Science
A logic-based framework to compute Pareto agreements in one-shot bilateral negotiation
Proceedings of the 2006 conference on ECAI 2006: 17th European Conference on Artificial Intelligence August 29 -- September 1, 2006, Riva del Garda, Italy
Extremal behaviour in multiagent contract negotiation
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
Negotiating socially optimal allocations of resources
Journal of Artificial Intelligence Research
An efficient protocol for negotiation over multiple indivisible resources
IJCAI'07 Proceedings of the 20th international joint conference on Artifical intelligence
On maximal classes of utility functions for efficient one-to-one negotiation
IJCAI'05 Proceedings of the 19th international joint conference on Artificial intelligence
The complexity of contract negotiation
Artificial Intelligence
Token Based Resource Sharing in Heterogeneous Multi-agent Teams
PRIMA '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Principles of Practice in Multi-Agent Systems
Extending propositional logic with concrete domains for multi-issue bilateral negotiation
DALT'07 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Declarative agent languages and technologies V
Human-inspired computational fairness
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Some representation and computational issues in social choice
ECSQARU'05 Proceedings of the 8th European conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty
Welfare engineering in practice: on the variety of multiagent resource allocation problems
ESAW'04 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Engineering Societies in the Agents World
Efficiency analysis of load balancing games with and without activation costs
Journal of Scheduling
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We analyse scenarios in which self-interested agents negotiate with each other in order to agree on deals to exchange resources. We consider two variants of the framework, one where agents can use money to compensate other agents for disadvantageous deals, and one where this is not possible. In both cases, we analyse what types of deals are necessary and sufficient to guarantee an optimal outcome of negotiation. To assess whether a given allocation of resources should be considered optimal we borrow two concepts from welfare economics: maximal social welfare in the case of the framework with money and Pareto optimality in the case of the framework without money. We also show how conditions for optimal outcomes can change depending on properties of the utility functions used by agents to represent the values they ascribe to certain sets of resources.