Channel coordination and quantity discounts
Management Science
The Effect of Collaborative Forecasting on Supply Chain Performance
Management Science
A Supplier's Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information
Management Science
The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain
Management Science
Supply Chain Inventory Management and the Value of Shared Information
Management Science
Capacity Investments in Supply Chains: Sharing the Gain Rather Than Sharing the Pain
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Sale Timing in a Supply Chain: When to Sell to the Retailer
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Information and Inventory in Distribution Channels
Management Science
How Improved Forecasts Can Degrade Decentralized Supply Chains
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Incentives for Retailer Forecasting: Rebates vs. Returns
Management Science
Dynamic Supplier Contracts Under Asymmetric Inventory Information
Operations Research
Optimal apparel supplier selection with forecast updates under carbon emission taxation scheme
Computers and Operations Research
Will a supplier benefit from sharing good information with a retailer?
Decision Support Systems
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This paper considers a manufacturer selling to a newsvendor retailer that possesses superior demand-forecast information. We show that the manufacturer's expected profit is convex in the retailer's forecasting accuracy: The manufacturer benefits from selling to a better-forecasting retailer if and only if the retailer is already a good forecaster. If the retailer has poor forecasting capabilities, then the manufacturer is hurt as the retailer's forecasting capability improves. More generally, the manufacturer tends to be hurt (benefit) by improved retailer forecasting capabilities if the product economics are lucrative (poor). Finally, the optimal procurement contract is a quantity discount contract.