Information distortion in a supply chain: the bullwhip effect
Management Science - Special issue on frontier research in manufacturing and logistics
Quick response in manufacturer-retailer channels
Management Science - Special issue on frontier research in manufacturing and logistics
Backup agreements in fashion buying—the value of upstream flexibility
Management Science
The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain
Management Science
The Benefits of Advance Booking Discount Programs: Model and Analysis
Management Science
Agent-based demand forecast in multi-echelon supply chain
Decision Support Systems
Revisiting the note on supply chain integration in vendor-managed inventory
Decision Support Systems
Does a Manufacturer Benefit from Selling to a Better-Forecasting Retailer?
Management Science
Coordinating a two-supplier and one-retailer supply chain with forecast updating
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
Coordination of the supply chain of seasonal products
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
Supply-chain coordination with combined contract for a short-life-cycle product
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
Information sharing has been known to be crucial in supply chain management. Prior empirical finding reveals that suppliers in practice tend to help their trading partners improve forecast accuracy. This paper examines this issue and explores the up-down (from an upstream supplier to a downstream retailer) strategic information sharing issues in a two-echelon supply chain. We first model a supply chain with forecast updating and returns policy. The forecast updating scheme adopts the Bayesian approach with unknown mean and unknown variance. We then proceed to analytically explore the effects of forecast updating on the supplier and the retailer. Our analysis has revealed that: 1. Demand information with low relevance can lead to a loss to the retailer. 2. In the absence of returns policy, the supplier has an incentive to provide ''bad information'' which may be harmful to the retailer. 3. The supplier will provide ''good information'' to the retailer only under the returns policy. 4. With up-down information sharing, win-win coordination can be achieved by using a proper returns policy. Many of these results can supplement and challenge the prior research findings that supplier has good incentive to help retailers in improving forecast.