Quick response in manufacturer-retailer channels
Management Science - Special issue on frontier research in manufacturing and logistics
Backup agreements in fashion buying—the value of upstream flexibility
Management Science
Contract Assembly: Dealing with Combined Supply Lead Time and Demand Quantity Uncertainty
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Coordination and Flexibility in Supply Contracts with Options
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Inventory Models with Fixed Costs, Forecast Updates, and Two Delivery Modes
Operations Research
Supply chain structure and demand risk
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
On the coordination of dynamic marketing channels and two-part tariffs
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Supplier Competition in Decentralized Assembly Systems with Price-Sensitive and Uncertain Demand
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Coordination of the supply chain of seasonal products
IEEE Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics, Part A: Systems and Humans
A differential game of retailer promotions
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
Will a supplier benefit from sharing good information with a retailer?
Decision Support Systems
Hi-index | 22.14 |
We consider the component-purchasing problem for a supply chain consisting of one retailer and two complementary suppliers with different lead-times. The retailer purchases a specific component from each supplier for assembling into a fashionable product. After ordering from the long-lead-time supplier (Supplier 1) and before ordering from the short-lead-time supplier (Supplier 2), the retailer can update its demand forecast for the product. The retailer can partially cancel its order from Supplier 1 after forecast updating. By formulating the problem as a dynamic optimization problem, we explore the measures that can be deployed to coordinate the retailer's ordering decisions with forecast updating. We analytically show that the supply chain can be coordinated if both suppliers offer a returns policy and Supplier 1 charges an order-cancelation penalty to the retailer. We find that the coordination mechanism is independent of demand distribution and the forecast updating process. We further show that it is easier for the suppliers to coordinate the supply chain if market observation indicates the future market demand is sufficiently large. We also study the case where demand is price-dependent and propose a generalized revenue-sharing contract to coordinate the supply chain. We discuss the academic and managerial implications of the theoretical findings.