Pricing and the News Vendor Problem: a Review with Extensions
Operations Research
Selling to the Newsvendor: An Analysis of Price-Only Contracts
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Capacity Games in Assembly Systems with Uncertain Demand
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Capacity Investments in Supply Chains: Sharing the Gain Rather Than Sharing the Pain
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Channel Performance Under Consignment Contract with Revenue Sharing
Management Science
Competition, Cooperation, and Information Sharing in a Two-Echelon Assembly System
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Inventory Policies in a Decentralized Assembly System
Operations Research
Competition and Cooperation in Decentralized Push and Pull Assembly Systems
Management Science
A Bargaining Framework in Supply Chains: The Assembly Problem
Management Science
Coalition Stability in Assembly Models
Operations Research
Alliance Formation Among Perfectly Complementary Suppliers in a Price-Sensitive Assembly System
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Coordinating a two-supplier and one-retailer supply chain with forecast updating
Automatica (Journal of IFAC)
The Newsvendor Problem with Advertising Revenue
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
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In a decentralized assembly supply chain, independent suppliers produce a set of complementary components from which an assembler assembles a final product and sells it to the market. In such a channel, several competitive forces interact with one another to affect the price and quantity decisions of the firms involved. These include: (1) the direct competition each supplier faces for producing the same component, (2) the indirect competition among the suppliers producing the set of complementary components needed for assembling the final product, and (3) the vertical interaction between the assembler and the component suppliers. This paper shows that the direct competition that one supplier faces helps improve the performance of the assembler and all the other suppliers in the channel; and surprisingly, it can help improve the performance of this particular supplier facing the competition as well. Second, the assembler benefits from a merger of suppliers producing different components in the complementary set. Furthermore, the assembler prefers a merger of suppliers with less direct competition over a merger of suppliers with more direct competition.