Installation vs. echelon stock policies for multilevel inventory control
Management Science
Lower bounds for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems
Management Science
Value of Information in Capacitated Supply Chains
Management Science
Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply Chains: Incentives and Information
Management Science
Competitive and Cooperative Inventory Policies in a Two-Stage Supply Chain
Management Science
Decentralized Supply Chains Subject to Information Delays
Management Science
Responsibility Tokens in Supply Chain Management
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Information Sharing in a Supply Chain with Horizontal Competition
Management Science
The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain
Management Science
Supply Chain Inventory Management and the Value of Shared Information
Management Science
Analysis of a Decentralized Production-Inventory System
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Capacity Games in Assembly Systems with Uncertain Demand
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
A General Equilibrium Model for Industries with Price and Service Competition
Operations Research
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Procuring Fast Delivery: Sole Sourcing with Information Asymmetry
Management Science
Inventory Policies in a Decentralized Assembly System
Operations Research
Supplier Competition in Decentralized Assembly Systems with Price-Sensitive and Uncertain Demand
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Alliance Formation Among Perfectly Complementary Suppliers in a Price-Sensitive Assembly System
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Competition and Cooperation in a Two-Stage Supply Chain with Demand Forecasts
Operations Research
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This paper studies a two-echelon assembly system and explores several important issues in managing decentralized supply chains. First, we investigate the behavior of the assembly system under decentralized control. It is shown that the Nash equilibrium of the competitive assembly system exists but is never system optimal. Next, we examine the role of information in the assembly system. We consider horizontal information sharing on the inventory status between the suppliers and demonstrate when information is valuable from the perspectives of the system and the individual player. We find that information sharing mitigates the system's competition penalty in some cases, but there are also instances in which information sharing can hurt a decentralized system. Although the manufacturer always prefers information sharing, it is sometimes in the interest of the suppliers to refuse to share information. Finally, we propose a demand-independent coordination scheme for managing decentralized supply chains with either a serial or an assembly structure. The coordination scheme has practical value because very often the firm's head (or the owner of the supply chain) does not have the accurate demand information that the local managers have. Alternatively, the demand varies over time, and the coordination contracts have to be modified. Under the transfer payment contract, the system optimal policy is the unique Nash equilibrium in the decentralized supply chain. Discussion on the relationship between our coordination scheme and existing methods in the literature is also provided.