Lower bounds for multi-echelon stochastic inventory systems
Management Science
Decentralized Multi-Echelon Supply Chains: Incentives and Information
Management Science
Competitive and Cooperative Inventory Policies in a Two-Stage Supply Chain
Management Science
Decentralized supply chains subject to information delays
Management Science
Responsibility Tokens in Supply Chain Management
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Analysis of a Forecasting-Production-Inventory System with Stationary Demand
Management Science
The Effect of Collaborative Forecasting on Supply Chain Performance
Management Science
Integrating Replenishment Decisions with Advance Demand Information
Management Science
The Value of Information Sharing in a Two-Level Supply Chain
Management Science
Optimal Replenishment Policies for Multiechelon Inventory Problems Under Advance Demand Information
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Modeling the Benefits of Sharing Future Demand Information
Operations Research
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Approximate Solutions of a Dynamic Forecast-Inventory Model
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Competition, Cooperation, and Information Sharing in a Two-Echelon Assembly System
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Inventory Policies in a Decentralized Assembly System
Operations Research
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We consider a serial supply chain with one supplier and one retailer. Each obtains some demand forecast information, which may be shared or not. We investigate the members' benefits from sharing information. The forecasts follow a variant of the Martingale model of forecast evolution (MMFE). We construct a simple transfer-payment scheme to align the players' incentives with that of the overall system. The main finding is that, unless the players' incentives are aligned in this way, sharing information makes little sense. It might hurt one or the other player and the system as a whole.