Information Flows in Capacitated Supply Chains with Fixed Ordering Costs
Management Science
Newsvendor Bounds and Heuristic for Optimal Policies in Serial Supply Chains
Management Science
Learning inventory management strategies for commodity supply chains with customer satisfaction
ICEC '06 Proceedings of the 8th international conference on Electronic commerce: The new e-commerce: innovations for conquering current barriers, obstacles and limitations to conducting successful business on the internet
Simulation based evaluation of information-centric supply chains
WSC '05 Proceedings of the 37th conference on Winter simulation
Secure and useful data sharing
Decision Support Systems
Supply chain integration in vendor-managed inventory
Decision Support Systems
Supply Chain Choice on the Internet
Management Science
Analysis of a Decentralized Supply Chain Under Partial Cooperation
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Competition, Cooperation, and Information Sharing in a Two-Echelon Assembly System
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Inventory Policies in a Decentralized Assembly System
Operations Research
Inventory control in a decentralised two-stage make-to-stock queueing system
International Journal of Systems Science - Production Coordination and Inventory Policies
Expert Systems with Applications: An International Journal
Supply Contracts with Financial Hedging
Operations Research
Two stage competition and supply chain coordination in a distribution system
CCDC'09 Proceedings of the 21st annual international conference on Chinese Control and Decision Conference
An adaptive inventory control for a supply chain
CCDC'09 Proceedings of the 21st annual international conference on Chinese control and decision conference
Dynamic Revenue Management in Airline Alliances
Transportation Science
Equilibrium Returns Policies in the Presence of Supplier Competition
Marketing Science
Competition and Cooperation in a Two-Stage Supply Chain with Demand Forecasts
Operations Research
Procurement Mechanism Design in a Two-Echelon Inventory System with Price-Sensitive Demand
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
A novel game-theory-based analysis approach for running a supply chain project
ICIC'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Intelligent computing: Part II
Scheduling optimisation for supply chain in networked manufacturing
International Journal of Computer Applications in Technology
Simultaneous coordination of order quantity and reorder point in a two-stage supply chain
Computers and Operations Research
Managing a Noncooperative Supply Chain with Limited Capacity
Operations Research
Evolutionary dynamics of an asymmetric game between a supplier and a retailer
ICNC'06 Proceedings of the Second international conference on Advances in Natural Computation - Volume Part II
Coordinated resource allocation by mutual outsourcing in decentralized supply chain
SEAL'06 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Simulated Evolution And Learning
Partner selection system development for an agile virtual enterprise based on gray relation analysis
APWeb'06 Proceedings of the 2006 international conference on Advanced Web and Network Technologies, and Applications
Optimal production policy for a volume-flexibility supply-chain system
ICIC'05 Proceedings of the 2005 international conference on Advances in Intelligent Computing - Volume Part II
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Computers and Industrial Engineering
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We investigate a two-stage serial supply chain with stationary stochastic demand and fixed transportation times. Inventory holding costs are charged at each stage, and each stage may incur a consumer backorder penalty cost, e.g. the upper stage (the supplier) may dislike backorders at the lower stage (the retailer). We consider two games. In both, the stages independently choose base stock policies to minimize their costs. The games differ in how the firms track their inventory levels (in one, the firms are committed to tracking echelon inventory; in the other they track local inventory). We compare the policies chosen under this competitive regime to those selected to minimize total supply chain costs, i.e., the optimal solution. We show that the games (nearly always) have a unique Nash equilibrium, and it differs from the optimal solution. Hence, competition reduces efficiency. Furthermore, the two games' equilibria are different, so the tracking method influences strategic behavior. We show that the system optimal solution can be achieved as a Nash equilibrium using simple linear transfer payments. The value of cooperation is context specific: In some settings competition increases total cost by only a fraction of a percent, whereas in other settings the cost increase is enormous. We also discuss Stackelberg equilibria.