On manufacturing/marketing incentives
Management Science
Pricing and the News Vendor Problem: a Review with Extensions
Operations Research
Impact of Uncertainty and Risk Aversion on Price and Order Quantity in the Newsvendor Problem
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Note: The Newsvendor Model with Endogenous Demand
Management Science
A Supplier's Optimal Quantity Discount Policy Under Asymmetric Information
Management Science
Designing Supply Contracts: Contract Type and Information Asymmetry
Management Science
The Dynamic Pricing Problem from a Newsvendor's Perspective
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Salesforce Incentives, Market Information, and Production/Inventory Planning
Management Science
A Principal-Agent Model for Product Specification and Production
Management Science
Procuring Fast Delivery: Sole Sourcing with Information Asymmetry
Management Science
Performance Contracting in After-Sales Service Supply Chains
Management Science
Contracting and Information Sharing Under Supply Chain Competition
Management Science
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Promised Lead-Time Contracts Under Asymmetric Information
Operations Research
Supply Disruptions, Asymmetric Information, and a Backup Production Option
Management Science
Supplier Competition in Decentralized Assembly Systems with Price-Sensitive and Uncertain Demand
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Media Revenue Management with Audience Uncertainty: Balancing Upfront and Spot Market Sales
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
Game theory and the practice of revenue management
Proceedings of the Behavioral and Quantitative Game Theory: Conference on Future Directions
Procurement Mechanism Design in a Two-Echelon Inventory System with Price-Sensitive Demand
Manufacturing & Service Operations Management
An Elasticity Approach to the Newsvendor with Price-Sensitive Demand
Operations Research
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We study a modified newsvendor model in which the newsvendor obtains a revenue from sales to end users as well as from an advertiser paying to obtain access to those end users. We study the optimal decisions for both a price-taking and a price-setting newsvendor when the advertiser has private information about its willingness to pay for advertisements. We find that the newsvendor's optimal policy excludes advertisers with low willingness to pay and distorts the price and quantity from its system-efficient level to screen the advertiser. Our analysis reveals the different roles that pricing and production quantity play as screening instruments. We perform a numerical analysis to investigate the value of information and the impact of the model parameters.