On the (in)security of IPsec in MAC-then-encrypt configurations

  • Authors:
  • Jean Paul Degabriele;Kenneth G. Paterson

  • Affiliations:
  • Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, United Kingdom;Royal Holloway, University of London, Egham, United Kingdom

  • Venue:
  • Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

IPsec allows a huge amount of flexibility in the ways in which its component cryptographic mechanisms can be combined to build a secure communications service. This may be good for supporting different security requirements but is potentially bad for security. We demonstrate the reality of this by describing efficient, plaintext-recovering attacks against all configurations of IPsec in which integrity protection is applied {\em prior} to encryption -- so-called MAC-then-encrypt configurations. We report on the implementation of our attacks against a specific IPsec implementation, and reflect on the implications of our attacks for real-world IPsec deployments as well as for theoretical cryptography.