Immunising CBC Mode Against Padding Oracle Attacks: A Formal Security Treatment
SCN '08 Proceedings of the 6th international conference on Security and Cryptography for Networks
Secure VPNs for Trusted Computing Environments
Trust '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Conference on Trusted Computing
Parsing ambiguities in authentication and key establishment protocols
International Journal of Electronic Security and Digital Forensics
On the (in)security of IPsec in MAC-then-encrypt configurations
Proceedings of the 17th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Cryptography for network security: failures, successes and challenges
MMM-ACNS'10 Proceedings of the 5th international conference on Mathematical methods, models and architectures for computer network security
On hiding a plaintext length by preencryption
ACNS'11 Proceedings of the 9th international conference on Applied cryptography and network security
Proceedings of the 18th ACM conference on Computer and communications security
Authenticated-Encryption with padding: a formal security treatment
Cryptography and Security
Security of symmetric encryption in the presence of ciphertext fragmentation
EUROCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
We describe new attacks which break any RFCcompliant implementation of IPsec making use of encryption-only ESP in tunnel mode. The new attacks are both efficient and realistic: they are ciphertext-only and need only the capability to eavesdrop on ESP-encrypted traffic and to inject traffic into the network. We report on our experiences in applying the attacks to a variety of implementations of IPsec.