Secret Sharing Over Infinite Domains (Extended Abstract)
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Security Flaws Induced by CBC Padding - Applications to SSL, IPSEC, WTLS ...
EUROCRYPT '02 Proceedings of the International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques: Advances in Cryptology
Attacking the IPsec Standards in Encryption-only Configurations
SP '07 Proceedings of the 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
On the Impossibility of Strong Encryption Over $\aleph_0$
IWCC '09 Proceedings of the 2nd International Workshop on Coding and Cryptology
Plaintext Recovery Attacks against SSH
SP '09 Proceedings of the 2009 30th IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Plaintext-Dependent decryption: a formal security treatment of SSH-CTR
EUROCRYPT'10 Proceedings of the 29th Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Cryptography in theory and practice: the case of encryption in IPsec
EUROCRYPT'06 Proceedings of the 24th annual international conference on The Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
Security of symmetric encryption in the presence of ciphertext fragmentation
EUROCRYPT'12 Proceedings of the 31st Annual international conference on Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques
| Hi-index | 0.00 |
It is a well known fact that encryption schemes cannot hide a plaintext length when it is unbounded. We thus admit that an approximation of it may leak and we focus on hiding its precise value. Some standards such as TLS or SSH offer to do it by applying some pad-then-encrypt techniques. In this study, we investigate the information leakage when these techniques are used. We define the notion of padding scheme and its associated security. We show that when a padding length is uniformly distributed, the scheme is nearly optimal. We also show that the insecurity degrades linearly with the padding length.