Efficient dispersal of information for security, load balancing, and fault tolerance
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Crowds: anonymity for Web transactions
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Xor-trees for efficient anonymous multicast and reception
ACM Transactions on Information and System Security (TISSEC)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Freenet: a distributed anonymous information storage and retrieval system
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
The free haven project: distributed anonymous storage service
International workshop on Designing privacy enhancing technologies: design issues in anonymity and unobservability
Anonymizing Censorship Resistant Systems
IPTPS '01 Revised Papers from the First International Workshop on Peer-to-Peer Systems
The Decision Diffie-Hellman Problem
ANTS-III Proceedings of the Third International Symposium on Algorithmic Number Theory
Anonymous Connections and Onion Routing
SP '97 Proceedings of the 1997 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
Publius: a robust, tamper-evident, censorship-resistant web publishing system
SSYM'00 Proceedings of the 9th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 9
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Rendezvous tunnel for anonymous publishing: clean slate and tor based designs
SSS'11 Proceedings of the 13th international conference on Stabilization, safety, and security of distributed systems
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Many anonymous peer-to-peer (P2P) file sharing systems have been proposed in recent years. One problem that remains open is how to protect the anonymity of all participating users, namely, reader, server and publisher. In this work we propose a novel solution for a P2P file sharing system. Our solution provides overall anonymity to all participating users. Servers in our system store shares of documents, and each share is reached through a rendezvous tunnel between the server and an address given by a hash of the document's name. To publish a document, the publisher first divides the document into shares, for each share finds the address of the entrance to the tunnel by hashing the document's name. Next, the publisher uses anonymous communication to reach the entrance of the rendezvous tunnel. We then use a random walk and an anonymous key exchange scheme to set keys along the rendezvous tunnel. The publisher finishes by inserting the shares into the servers through the rendezvous tunnels. A reader wanting to retrieve the document operates in a similar manner. The reader finds the address of the entrance to the rendezvous tunnels by hashing the document's name. Then, the reader uses anonymous communication to reach the entrance of the tunnels, retrieves the shares anonymously and reconstructs the document. The novelty of this work is threefold. First, we introduce an anonymous key exchange protocol secure against an honest but curious adversary. The anonymity of the protocol is proved on the basis of the Decisional Diffie Hellman (DDH) problem. Second, we propose two solutions to build the rendezvous tunnel: basic and advanced. The basic solution is straightforward, while the advanced solution is based on the key exchange protocol. In the advanced solution, the key exchange is done between the publisher and each user along the rendezvous tunnel. Third, the rendezvous tunnel is used as a building block for an anonymous P2P file sharing system that provides anonymity to all participating users.