A public key cryptosystem and a signature scheme based on discrete logarithms
Proceedings of CRYPTO 84 on Advances in cryptology
How to prove yourself: practical solutions to identification and signature problems
Proceedings on Advances in cryptology---CRYPTO '86
Achieving independence in logarithmic number of rounds
PODC '87 Proceedings of the sixth annual ACM Symposium on Principles of distributed computing
Entity authentication and key distribution
CRYPTO '93 Proceedings of the 13th annual international cryptology conference on Advances in cryptology
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
Untraceable electronic mail, return addresses, and digital pseudonyms
Communications of the ACM
Efficient Identification and Signatures for Smart Cards
CRYPTO '89 Proceedings of the 9th Annual International Cryptology Conference on Advances in Cryptology
Tor: the second-generation onion router
SSYM'04 Proceedings of the 13th conference on USENIX Security Symposium - Volume 13
Preserving user's privacy in web search engines
Computer Communications
How to break a practical MIX and design a new one
EUROCRYPT'00 Proceedings of the 19th international conference on Theory and application of cryptographic techniques
A survey of single-database private information retrieval: techniques and applications
PKC'07 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Practice and theory in public-key cryptography
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Web search has become an integral part of our lives and we use it daily for business and pleasure. Unfortunately, however, we unwittingly reveal a huge amount of private information about ourselves when we search the web. A look at a user's search terms over a period of a few months paints a frighteningly clear and detailed picture about the user's life. In this paper, we build on previous work by Castellà-Roca et al. (Computer Communications 2009) and show how to achieve privacy in web searches efficiently and practically without resorting to full-blown anonymous routing. In contrast to previous work, our protocol is secure in the presence of malicious adversaries.