Modeling competitive bidding: a critical essay
Management Science
Impact of ending rules in online auctions: the case of yahoo.com
Decision Support Systems
Analysis of single and networked auctions
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Decision Analysis: The Right Tool for Auctions
Decision Analysis
An Approximate Model for Bidders in Sequential Automated Auctions
KES-AMSTA '09 Proceedings of the Third KES International Symposium on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications
Performance of Auctions and Sealed Bids
EPEW '09 Proceedings of the 6th European Performance Engineering Workshop on Computer Performance Engineering
Modelling Bidders in Sequential Automated Auctions
The Computer Journal
Analysis of automated auctions
ISCIS'06 Proceedings of the 21st international conference on Computer and Information Sciences
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The rule with which automated computerised auctions are closed play an important role in determining bidder strategies and auction outcomes. In this paper we examine two such rules: auctions with randomised closing times and fixed deadlines. To this end, stochastic models of auctions with discrete state-space representing the prices attained are developed and analysed. The models allow us to determine the stationary probabilistic outcomes of the auctions, which are used to examine the bidder performance, measured as the savings it makes with respect to the maximum payable or its payoff. For this purpose, one bidder is singled out as the "special bidder" (SB) and its performance is studied as a function of the speed with which it raises the price, or its bid rate. The results show that with random closures, the SB has incentives to place bids promptly to obtain high savings; on the other hand, with fixed deadline auctions, the SB should choose its bid rate with respect to the other system parameters in order to maximise payoffs.