An optimal strategy for sellers in an online auction
ACM Transactions on Internet Technology (TOIT)
Optimality and Risk in Purchase from Multiple Auctions
CIA '01 Proceedings of the 5th International Workshop on Cooperative Information Agents V
Adaptive limited-supply online auctions
EC '04 Proceedings of the 5th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Optimal design of English auctions with discrete bid levels
Proceedings of the 6th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Computational-Mechanism Design: A Call to Arms
IEEE Intelligent Systems
An Approximate Model for Bidders in Sequential Automated Auctions
KES-AMSTA '09 Proceedings of the Third KES International Symposium on Agent and Multi-Agent Systems: Technologies and Applications
Performance of Auctions and Sealed Bids
EPEW '09 Proceedings of the 6th European Performance Engineering Workshop on Computer Performance Engineering
MyAds: A system for adaptive pervasive advertisements
Pervasive and Mobile Computing
Analysing bidder performance in randomised and fixed-deadline automated auctions
KES-AMSTA'10 Proceedings of the 4th KES international conference on Agent and multi-agent systems: technologies and applications, Part II
Analysis of an automated auction with concurrent multiple unit acceptance capacity
ASMTA'10 Proceedings of the 17th international conference on Analytical and stochastic modeling techniques and applications
Stochastic Modelling and Optimisation of Internet Auction Processes
Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science (ENTCS)
A new queueing model for spectrum renting in mobile cellular networks
Computer Communications
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Web-based computerized auctions are increasingly present in the Internet. We can imagine that in the future this trend will actually be extended to situations where virtual buyer and seller agents will conduct automated transactions across the network, and that large sectors of the economy may be strucured in this manner. The purpose of this article is to model automated bidders and sellers which interact through a network. We model the bidding process as a random arrival process while the price attained by a good is modeled as a discrete random variable. We obtain analytical solutions allowing us to compute the income from a single auction, or the income per unit time from a repeated sequence of auctions. A variety of single-auction models are studied, including English and Vickrey auctions, and the income per unit time is derived as a function of other parameters, including the rate of arrival of bids, the seller's decision time, the value of the good, and the “rest time” of the seller between successive auctions. We illustrate the results via numerical examples. We also introduce a model for networked auctions where bidders can circulate among a set of interconnected auctions which we call the Mobile Bidder Model (MBM). We obtain an analytical solution for the MBM under the assumption,which we call the “active bidders assumption,” that activities that are internal to an auction (bids and sales) are much more frequent than changes that occur in the number of bidders at each auction.