The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
On the run-time behaviour of stochastic local search algorithms for SAT
AAAI '99/IAAI '99 Proceedings of the sixteenth national conference on Artificial intelligence and the eleventh Innovative applications of artificial intelligence conference innovative applications of artificial intelligence
Hard variants of stable marriage
Theoretical Computer Science
Stable Marriage with Incomplete Lists and Ties
ICAL '99 Proceedings of the 26th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
A 3/2-Approximation Algorithm for General Stable Marriage
ICALP '09 Proceedings of the 36th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming: Part I
Elicitation and approximately stable matching with partial preferences
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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The stable marriage problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools, or more generally to any two-sided market. We consider a useful variation of the stable marriage problem, where the men and women express their preferences using a preference list with ties over a subset of the members of the other sex. Matchings are permitted only with people who appear in these preference lists. In this setting, we study the problem of finding a stable matching that marries as many people as possible. Stability is an envy-free notion: no man and woman who are not married to each other would both prefer each other to their partners or to being single. This problem is NP-hard. We tackle this problem using local search, exploiting properties of the problem to reduce the size of the neighborhood and to make local moves efficiently. Experimental results show that this approach is able to solve large problems, quickly returning stable matchings of large and often optimal size.