The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
NP-complete stable matching problems
Journal of Algorithms
Stable marriage and indifference
CO89 Selected papers of the conference on Combinatorial Optimization
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Computers and Intractability: A Guide to the Theory of NP-Completeness
Clique is hard to approximate within n1-
FOCS '96 Proceedings of the 37th Annual Symposium on Foundations of Computer Science
Inapproximability Results on Stable Marriage Problems
LATIN '02 Proceedings of the 5th Latin American Symposium on Theoretical Informatics
Strong Stability in the Hospitals/Residents Problem
STACS '03 Proceedings of the 20th Annual Symposium on Theoretical Aspects of Computer Science
Better and Simpler Approximation Algorithms for the Stable Marriage Problem
ESA '08 Proceedings of the 16th annual European symposium on Algorithms
Designing a Two-Sided Matching Protocol under Asymmetric Information
PRIMA '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Principles of Practice in Multi-Agent Systems
A 25/17-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem with one-sided ties
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
ESA'10 Proceedings of the 18th annual European conference on Algorithms: Part II
Local search for stable marriage problems with ties and incomplete lists
PRICAI'10 Proceedings of the 11th Pacific Rim international conference on Trends in artificial intelligence
Mapping problems to dynamical systems for robustness and adaptability: the case of matching problems
Proceedings of the International Conference on Management of Emergent Digital EcoSystems
A (2 - c1/√N)-approximation algorithm for the stable marriage problem
ISAAC'05 Proceedings of the 16th international conference on Algorithms and Computation
Popular matchings in the marriage and roommates problems
CIAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and Complexity
Communication requirements for stable marriages
CIAC'10 Proceedings of the 7th international conference on Algorithms and Complexity
A market clearing solution for social lending
IJCAI'11 Proceedings of the Twenty-Second international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence - Volume Volume One
On finding better friends in social networks
SSS'12 Proceedings of the 14th international conference on Stabilization, Safety, and Security of Distributed Systems
Elicitation and approximately stable matching with partial preferences
IJCAI'13 Proceedings of the Twenty-Third international joint conference on Artificial Intelligence
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The original stable marriage problem requires all men and women to submit a complete and strictly ordered preference list. This is obviously often unrealistic in practice, and several relaxations have been proposed, including the following two common ones: one is to allow an incomplete list, i.e., a man is permitted to accept only a subset of the women and vice versa. The other is to allow a preference list including ties. Fortunately, it is known that both relaxed problems can still be solved in polynomial time. In this paper, we show that the situation changes substantially if we allow both relaxations (incomplete lists and ties) at the same time: the problem not only becomes NP-hard, but also the optimal cost version has no approximation algorithm achieving the approximation ratio of N1-Ɛ, where N is the instance size, unless P=NP.