Designing an auction protocol under asymmetric information on nature's selection
Proceedings of the first international joint conference on Autonomous agents and multiagent systems: part 1
Stable Marriage with Incomplete Lists and Ties
ICAL '99 Proceedings of the 26th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Uncoordinated two-sided matching markets
Proceedings of the 9th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
A private stable matching algorithm
FC'06 Proceedings of the 10th international conference on Financial Cryptography and Data Security
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We have developed a new two-sided matching protocol including job applicants and employers in the condition that applicants have conditional preferences and well informed applicants exist. In past research, two-sided matching has covered some assignment problems such as residency matching. However, in the case of matching on the information network, different applicants are differently informed and well informed applicants hide its information to obtain more desirable matching. That is, asymmetric information possessed by applicants causes unstable matching. To overcome this difficulty, we design a new two-sided matching protocol in which applicants are allowed to report their conditional preferences and well informed applicants generally have an incentive to share information among applicants by allowing applicants to report their conditional preferences and deciding the matching on the basis of the preferences of applicants who share information (informers). We experimentally evaluated our protocol through simulation and found that the protocol can attain more satisfactory matching.