Marriage, honesty, and stability
SODA '05 Proceedings of the sixteenth annual ACM-SIAM symposium on Discrete algorithms
Cheating by men in the gale-shapley stable matching algorithm
ESA'06 Proceedings of the 14th conference on Annual European Symposium - Volume 14
A probabilistic model of integration
Decision Support Systems
Manipulation and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Proceedings of The 8th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multiagent Systems - Volume 1
Designing a Two-Sided Matching Protocol under Asymmetric Information
PRIMA '09 Proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Principles of Practice in Multi-Agent Systems
Cheating to get better roommates in a random stable matching
STACS'07 Proceedings of the 24th annual conference on Theoretical aspects of computer science
Manipulation complexity and gender neutrality in stable marriage procedures
Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems
Weights in stable marriage problems increase manipulation opportunities
Proceedings of the 13th Conference on Theoretical Aspects of Rationality and Knowledge
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We study strategic issues in the Gale-Shapley stable marriage model. In the first part of the paper, we derive the optimal cheating strategy and show that it is not always possible for a woman to recover her women-optimal stable partner from the men-optimal stable matching mechanism when she can only cheat by permuting her preferences. In fact, we show, using simulation, that the chances that a woman can benefit from cheating are slim. In the second part of the paper, we consider a two-sided matching market found in Singapore. We study the matching mechanism used by the Ministry of Education (MOE) in the placement of primary six students in secondary schools, and discuss why the current method has limited success in accommodating the preferences of the students, and the specific needs of the schools (in terms of the "mix" of admitted students). Using insights from the first part of the paper, we show that stable matching mechanisms are more appropriate in this matching market and explain why the strategic behavior of the students need not be a major concern.