An efficient algorithm for the “optimal” stable marriage
Journal of the ACM (JACM)
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
Stable marriage and indifference
CO89 Selected papers of the conference on Combinatorial Optimization
The structure of stable marriage with indifference
Discrete Applied Mathematics
Matching Medical Students to Pairs of Hospitals: A New Variation on a Well-Known Theme
ESA '98 Proceedings of the 6th Annual European Symposium on Algorithms
Approximability results for stable marriage problems with ties
Theoretical Computer Science
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The stable marriage problem is a well-known problem of matching men to women so that no man and woman, who are not married to each other, both prefer each other. Such a problem has a wide variety of practical applications, ranging from matching resident doctors to hospitals, to matching students to schools or more generally to any two-sided market. In the classical stable marriage problem, both men and women express a strict preference order over the members of the other sex, in a qualitative way. Here we consider stable marriage problems with weighted preferences: each man (resp., woman) provides a score for each woman (resp., man). In this context, we consider the manipulability properties of the procedures that return stable marriages. While we know that all procedures are manipulable by modifying the preference lists or by truncating them, here we consider if manipulation can occur also by just modifying the weights while preserving the ordering and avoiding truncation. It turns out that, by adding weights, we indeed increase the possibility of manipulating and this cannot be avoided by any reasonable restriction on the weights.