The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
The stable marriage problem: structure and algorithms
Stable Marriage with Incomplete Lists and Ties
ICAL '99 Proceedings of the 26th International Colloquium on Automata, Languages and Programming
Proceedings of the 10th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
Matching in networks with bilateral contracts: extended abstract
Proceedings of the 11th ACM conference on Electronic commerce
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The social lending market, with over a billion dollars in loans, is a two-sided matching market where borrowers specify demands and lenders specify total budgets and their desired interest rates from each acceptable borrower. Because different borrowers correspond to different risk-return profiles, lenders have preferences over acceptable borrowers; a borrower prefers lenders in order of the interest rates they offer to her. We investigate the question of what is a computationally feasible, 'good', allocation to clear this market. We design a strongly polynomial time algorithm for computing a Pareto-efficient stable outcome in a two-sided many-to-many matching market with indifferences, and use this to compute an allocation for the social lending market that satisfies the properties of stability -- a standard notion of fairness in two-sided matching markets -- and Pareto efficiency; and additionally addresses envy-freeness amongst similar borrowers and risk diversification for lenders.