Iterated regret minimization in game graphs

  • Authors:
  • Emmanuel Filiot;Tristan Le Gall;Jean-François Raskin

  • Affiliations:
  • Université Libre de Bruxelles;Université Libre de Bruxelles;Université Libre de Bruxelles

  • Venue:
  • MFCS'10 Proceedings of the 35th international conference on Mathematical foundations of computer science
  • Year:
  • 2010

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Abstract

Iterated regret minimization has been introduced recently by J.Y. Halpern and R. Pass in classical strategic games. For many games of interest, this new solution concept provides solutions that are judged more reasonable than solutions offered by traditional game concepts - such as Nash equilibrium -. In this paper, we investigate iterated regret minimization for infinite duration two-player quantitative non-zero sum games played on graphs.